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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DOHO'l'HY GRAHAM (L()pgz)
Plaintiff and Appellant,

l

vs.

RISK l\LUTUAL
T~~URANCl1~ COl\fPANY

l'lH~i''lj~HIH~D

lJrff'11da11f a11d Respondent.

\

Case
No. 10645

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
R~~LIKB'

SOUGHT

Plaiittiff is entitled to a trial on the merits. 'l1he
motion dismissing plaintiff's complaint with the prejudice should he abated and set aside and the plaintiff
allowed a trial on the merits.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Parties arc being referred to as the same in court
below.
On April 18, 1964, at approximately midnight Dorothy Graham collided with another automobile at 3500
1

South 3600 \Vest in Salt Lake Cou11ty, rta1i.

Tl1Pn, w, 1 ~

no claim of intoxication, no tiC'kets ·were is<.:lH'r1 l 1y tJi,.
inY0stigating officer; in faet, hP was a \\itnr·ss for \Trs.
Graham that she was not illtn:xicater1. Thr> srJlr: issue was
which car ran the trnffic light. SnrJsr,qur·nt1:-. \YaltPr
Sterzer sued Dorothy Graham (Lopez) fnr $1,Gi:l.J11
property clamage; $:26:J.OO Special drimagr~: ~2~J{)(J r11;
General damage: .Jean SterzPr. 11is wifr·. snr·c1 D<•l•it ]11
Graham for $10,000.00 GP11Pra1 11amagC> aw1 ~ii:i.00 Sp,·cial damagPs. She turned hPr s11mm011s itlH1 c·litims n\·., 1
to her insurancP company, the c1Pfonr1rrnts ]1r>n·i11. a11d
the:· refusPd to defend. Tlwy r1P11iN1 con·rn!!1· 11po11 tl11·
g-ronm1s that when she> applic·d for i11snrnnc·c· n11 .J1111(' ·:.
1960, she signed an application l11n11k ill wl1i<·l1 "-n..; i'ri11t

ed that the applicant r1id not ll'C intnxiC"flting lwHra~r"'
and would not during the term of the pnlic:-. Tl1•· i11:-"lll'ance comrmny not on1:· illformc·11 Dnrntl1:- (~rnl1<1rn tliat
."he had no coYerage lmt al.'o i11fiirmc·11 tl11' ~t1·1z1·r'. tlH·i1
attorney Yictor Sagers arn1 the Lake "\Tntors. tl1r· otli11
claimants in the suit. that thl'l'l-. "-as i10 cnn·rn!!t'. all ot
which was in writing.
rpon being told that sht• lrnt1 110 C'OYL-1'<1\!:l', ,:}i\' ('illploy-ed ~[ark S. ~liner who defrnt1CL1 the ,-uit 11rn11U"l1t ll\·
the Stcrzer's and who also 1irong-ht this snit for

,farnag-r~

against the Preforred Risk Insurance Cci. for l1rrach
of contract on the policy. Sn11sl)t}lWlltl:- aft(·r 1m'tri:il
the Prefrrred Risk Insurance Co. setth>Ll "-irh thr ~trrz
L'rs hut refused to settle with Dorothy Graham for ltn'pital bills for ht:.>rself and lwr lrnsba1lll .foe Lc111ez. Tliry
also refusrd to pay any attorney fee5 to her attornrY
)[ark S. )[int•r for his defense in the Sterzer easr.
,...,

This rase ,,·as pretried on March 9, 1966 hy the
lfonornhle .Joseph .Jeppson, who ruled that the plaintiff
was e1,titlc•d to a jnry trial on the issues herein, rulin~
tlwt the issue of any representations or warranties and/
•Jl' their matr,rialit~r were for the jury to decide.
On ~ray 9, 19G6, the day set for jury trial, Counsel
\<.;1.c:

,.,d]!·d into the chambers of .Judge Ellett who, with

;ill of tlH• plaintiff's witnesses and the jury setting the
, ourt room. summarily granted a motion dismissing
pl<1i11liff's rase on the repr0s0ntation of the Insurance
<'ompnny f'On11srl that Dorothy Graham (Lopez) had
\\\ o drinks at npproximately 7 p.m. the day of the acc.idt·nt, maintaining that intoxication was immaterial.
l'L11ntiff's eonnscl had no notice or knowledge that any
c:nrli moti011 wonl<l he mad0, he was not allowed to submit
,1m e\·i1knrc, t>H'll though his witnesses were in the court
room, 110 affidavits or counter affidavits were allowed, on
tl11 mrrr representation of the Company's Counsel the
plni11tiff's cause was dismissed. Absolutely no evidence
11 ;1s before the court.
Plaintiff was not allowed to int rodn<'f' the policy or documents favorable to plaintiff's
rnnsc nml although the adjuster who had written the
(1o('ument tcad hy the Company attorney was subpoenaed
tl1c ('Ourt refused to let him testify. THE COURT
RULED THAT ANY DRINKING, HOWEVER MIXFTTA. OX THE PART OF DOROTHY GRAHAM
\ FTER THE APPLICATION BLANK WAS SIGNED
\'( llDED THE POLICY.
Thi' application upon which the Court ruled was filled
out on .June 3, 1960, hy Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance

3

Company's agent. A copy is annexed hereto and hy reference made a part hereof. The application provide 8
that it is to he filed hy their agent. No copy was gfren to
Dorothy Graham Lopez. The representation which
prompted the summary ruling of the Court is item :1
under REPRESENT A TIO NS: ''I do not use alcoholie
beverages and will not do so for the term of the po lie~-."
On the hasis of this application the defendant company issued a policy for collision arnl compn•lw11siY<'
co,·erage on a 1954 Ford automohile. This polic~· wns
renewed December 3, 1960; .Tmw :), 1961; aml the11 011
September 21, 1961, without any n0w applicatio11 or inquiry hy the insurance company the polie~· was transferred to 1958 Bel Air Che\Tol0t and the conrag-P was
increased to include bodily injury and medical pa~·mt·nts.
This latter policy was renew0d on 12-3-fil, 6-3-62, 12-:~-()2;
then on 4-23-63 the policy was transfe1-r0<1 to a l~Hi:l
Comet; with a subsequent r0m'wal hei11g made 011 6-:l-(i:l
and 12-3-65, with the policy lwing in full fon·0 arnl pffr<'1
on April 18, 1964, the date of tlw collision from whicl1
this action a rose.
POINTS OF LA vV
1. The Court erred in snmmarilv dismissi11g plai11-

tiff 's case without notice, without allowi11g plaintiff to
present any evidence or affidavits, without permitfo1g thP
plaintiff to present any law.
2. The Court erred in holding that the representation that policy applicant did not drink and would not
during the term of the policy was a warranty.
4

The Court erred in holding that any drinking,
however minutia, of alcoholic beverage voided policy
from beginning; and that the issue of intoxication was
inunatcrial.
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PLAINTIFF'S CASE: (1) WITHOUT NOTICJiJ; (2) WITHOUT ALLOWING THE
PLAINTIFF TO PRESENT ANY WITNESSF,S, gvIDENCE, OR EVEN AN AFFIDAVIT;
WITHOUT PERMITTIING THE PLAINTIFF TO PRESENT ANY LAW.

on

!\lay 9, 1966, at 10 a.m., Counsel was called into the

cliamhcrs of Hon. A. H. Ellett; Judge Ellett said that
tli<'fe was question of coverage that should be settled if
the plaintiff had been drinking. An argument ensued,
part of whieh was taken down and part of which was not
tnken down. The reporter mistakenly put Mr. Miner on
rrma rks made hy Mr. Kipp. To-wit: She drank several
ronrnls between seven thirty and midnight." This was
a r'~mark made by Mr. Kipp and Mr. Miner violently obj0rtcd to same and it was Mr. Miner who said, "I don't
think that is right and I doubt Mr. Kipp will claim otherwise." Mr. Kipp did produc.e a statement made by an
immnmcc adjuster which stated the Plaintiff had two
highballs in the area of seven o'clock. Mr. Kipp argued
that intoxication was immaterial. The Plaintiff was in
rourt, the adjuster was under subpoena, the investigating
offie<>r was available to testify that the plaintiff was not
iutoxica.ted; in fact, Mr. Kipp made no claim of intoxication but claimed a breach of warranty. Stating that
5

when the drinking occurred the amount was immat<•rial.
The t>ntire proceeding did not last ;) minutPs and 1110
Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint.
Rule 56 providL•s that a part~- is entitle<l to 10 <la>·s'
notice lwfore the time fixed for a hearing. Plai11tiff
had none. The rule also provides that tlw adverse part~
may file affidavits or pro<luce evi<lPnce; this right ,,·as
<lenied the plaintiff, even though the plailltiff had suhpoenaed wihwss sitting in the court room. Plaintiff and
her attorney was d<'nied th<' right to submit anv law to
support their position; the Court arbitrarily rnk'd without notice, without <'Videnee and without givi11g tlw plaintiff a right to be heard. This all owrrnlPd a prPvions
ruling by the Honorable .Jospph .Jeppson who had im·viously held that the quPstion of l"PJH'L'Selltation a11d/or
warranty was an issuP, alld that tlw quPstion of its mat(•riality was one of fact to lw <lPcidPd hy th<' jur>-. This
all addC'd to the complete surprisP of tlw plai11titf wl10
came prepared to try said issm's on the faet arnl tlH' law
as was laid down by the prC'-trial judge>.
This Court has consistl•lltl~· lwld that a snmma r>·
judgment should only be grantPd wlwn takillg tlw viL•w
most favorable to party's claim and any proof that rnigl1t
be properly adduced thereurnlPr, he could ill 110 l'Hllt
prevail. See Kidman v. White, :H8 Pac. 2d 898, 14 rtal1
2d 142. In the instant case on tlw mere remark of "All
right. I will grant the motion." (This counsel knows of
no motion being made nor its contents.) "I don't thi11k
this is covered. I think if thC'y say they are not going to
drink and get a red need rate, the party doesn't cover it.''

6

'rcll the jury they are discharged ... " There was no
"'·idPnce of a reduced rate; there was no evidence of in1ox irn tion; the only evidence of drinking was remarks by
th~ insurance company's counsel. Every right granted
the plaintiff under Rule 56 was violated. Every rule pro;10unced hy this Court on summary judgments was tra, 1'rst><l. Plaintiff was denied every right granted by this
.·ourt, to-wit: that of notice; right to be heard and presrnt proof; the right to present the cases and law on the
points rn 18sue.
POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN ARBITRARILY
RULING THAT THE REPRESENTATION ON
THE APPLICATION WAS A WARRANTY IN
'rHE POLICY.
'rhe plaintiff had the policy in court but the Court
rrfnset1 to examine same. The policy has no such warnrnt~· or representation nor was it in any way included by
: <'frrPnce. The application blank for collision and compn•IH'llsin• insurance was filled out by the defendant's
ngPnt four and one-half years prior to the collision. No
<'Opy was given plaintiff nor was the representation discussed. It is true that under "Representations" there
was printed ''I do not use alcoholic beverages and will
not do so for the term of this policy." Defendant then
(•arrfully investigated the plaintiff and then issued a polw\· free and clear of any such representation. No men1io11 was ever made of it until the plaintiff suffered a loss
nt which time the defendants denied coverage. The law
in this regard is clear that the courts are strongly against
forfeitures of insurance coverage. See Murray v. Home

7

Benefit Ass'n, 9 California 402, 27 Pac. 309; Mitigrr Y.
N cw York Life Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 2d 834, 112 Pac. 2d 621;
Heber v. Life Ins. Co., 18 Calif. 2d 269, 63 Par. 2d 318.

The courts further generally hold the forfeiture should
be granted unless the warranty is set forth in the pofay
in dear and unmistakable terms; Bittinger v. N eui York
Life Insurana Company, 17 Calif. 2d 834, 112 Pac. 2d
621. Courts are opposed to forfeitures of insurance policies on technical grounds. See Howell v. American 111surance, 114 Calif. 660, 84 Pac. 182. It is generally hrld
that the courts are opposed to unreasonable forfeitmes
and technical forfeitures on rules which are unrelatrd to
the merits of the case. Olds v. General Accident and FirP
Ins. Co., 67 Calif. 2d 842, 5 Pac. 2d 676. Attempts to cancel policies after the insured has suffered a loss is not tolerated or permitted in states where compulsory insura11cr
is required. This rule is applied equally to the insured
as well as the third party, Ohran v. National his. ('o., 82
Calif. 2d 636, 187 Pac. 2d 66.
Representations are not warranties and thesr arr
written or oral statements made prior to the completion
of the contract policy and usually gfre information to
the insurer on the subject of insurance, and from these
facts the insurance company determines whrtlwr or not
it will issue the policy. Representations rarely qualify
as an express provisions in the policy of insurance, hut
in some instances it may qualify as an implied warranty
where active fraud is present. In matters or opinion a
representation is false only when it is intended to hr
false. The fact that a representation is based on opinion
or estimate distinguishes it from a warranty and suhse-

8

q111•ut fad which different from the original opinion or

('stirrwte does not necessarily render the representation
1111trne. In matters of health or habits a representation
of fra ml or of deceit are required in order to change the
reprcsrntation to an implied warranty. These facts must
h<> drawn from the circumstances and it is a question for
tltr jury. vVhere there is no fraud or deceit rescission or
forfeiture is not allowed. In this case the rlefendant claims
no fraud or deceit but relies solely on breach of implied
warra11t~'. The Courts are unanimous in holding not only
that fraud and deceit are necessary elements, but the
fraurl and deceit proved must be material to the cause.
In instant case the defendant has maintained that intoxiratio11 is immaterial, that any drinking of even a minutia.
nature would void the policy, all of which is contra to the
established law. See McClelland v. New York Life Ins.
r'o., 2;) Calif. 694, 139 Pa~. 2d 242; Martin v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Ins. Co., 71 Calif. 2d 557, 162
Pac. 2d 980.
CONCLUSION

It is generally held that to render a representation
a \\-'arranty there must be a misrepresentation of an
existing fact, promises and opinions and estimates projcctC'd in the future are seldom if ever held to be an implied warranty in that active fraud is never present under
thcRe circumstances. Representations are matters of indueC'ment merely, and usually relate to present existing
facts or conditions and need only be substantially true
and must relate to a material matter in order to qualify
as an implied warranty. See Spence v. Central Accident
9

Insurance Co., 86 N.E. 104, 236 Ill. 44, 19 L.R.A. (N.~.)
88. Ordinarily, a statement made on an application blank
is a representation only and must me incorporated by
rl'ference in the policy before it hecam<'s a warranty. IH
the instant case this was never done. See North A 111eri"a
Ins. Co. v. Rchacek, 123 Ill. App. 219. A good example of
this problem often arises in cases of honesty bonds whrrP
hank officials certify that their employees are hmwst
and will remain so in the future as an inducC'ment to the
issuance of the policy. This has g<'11erally heen hPld to hP
a representation in that it is a11 opi11io11 and therrfo1P
not a warranty. Sec (iut11rir National Hank"· Pirlelit.11
Deposit and Guarmdec of Jfaryla.Jl(l, 87 Pac. 2d :100, H
Okla. 636, also 17 Oklahoma 397, citing Ri('I' Y. Firll'iit.11
and Deposit of Jfaryland, 103 Fed. 430 a11<l -1:3 ('ra :l/O.
In every instant in order to Yoid policy the representatio11

must he of

a material

nature.

In view of the foregoing the con rt erred in voidi11~
the policy without evidence; in that the reprC'se11tati011
was one of opinion trivial in nature aml not material to
the accident in that Dorothy Graham Lop('Z was 110!
intoxicated.
Respectfully submitted,
MARKS. :\IIINER
210 Federated S('curity Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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